Publication: The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare
The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare
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Dietl, H. M., & Lang, M. (2008). The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare. Contemporary Economic Policy, 26(3), 448–459. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2007.00090.x
Abstract
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This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league based on contest theory and studies the welfare effect of gale revenue sharing. It derives two counterintuitive results. First, it challenges the "invariance proposition" by showing that revenue sharing reduces competitive balance and thus produces a more unbalanced league. Second, the paper concludes that a lower degree of competitive balance compared with the noncooperative league equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare and club profits. Combining both resul
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- Lang, M
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Citations
Dietl, H. M., & Lang, M. (2008). The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare. Contemporary Economic Policy, 26(3), 448–459. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2007.00090.x
