Publication: Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
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Mennle, T., & Seuken, S. (2021). Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 191, 105144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144
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We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept t
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- Mennle, Timo
- Seuken, Sven
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Mennle, T., & Seuken, S. (2021). Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 191, 105144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144
