Publication: The dysgenics objection to longtermism
The dysgenics objection to longtermism
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de Vries, B. (2024). The dysgenics objection to longtermism. Futures, 162, 103417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103417
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Strong longtermism maintains that how we should act morally is determined almost entirely by the expected effects on the welfare of our descendants existing thousands if not millions of years into the future, who might include both other humans and any artificial agents with a comparable or higher moral status that we end up creating. It is based on three key assumptions: (i) that our descendants will have a moral status that is at least as high as ours and therefore should not have their welfare discounted by us; (ii) that there is a
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de Vries, B. (2024). The dysgenics objection to longtermism. Futures, 162, 103417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103417