Publication: An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
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Hagedorn, M., Kaul, A., & Mennel, T. (2010). An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3), 490–502. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.10.005
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We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare-improving in a heterogeneous population. We adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in Shavell and Weiss(1979), supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents’ job opportunities. Our main theoretical contribution is a quasi-recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem, including a geometric characterization of the state space. Our main economic result is that optimal contracts for ‘‘bad’’ searchers tend to be upward sloping due to an adve
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- Hagedorn, M
- Kaul, A
- Mennel, T
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Hagedorn, M., Kaul, A., & Mennel, T. (2010). An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3), 490–502. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.10.005
