Publication: Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion
Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion
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Pfisterer, C. C. (2019). Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion. In G. M. Mras, P. Weingartner, & B. Ritter (Eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics : Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium (No. 27; Issue 27, pp. 169–182). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-011
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In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege's conception of assertion. "Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption", says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the "assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting" – any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as
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Pfisterer, C. C. (2019). Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion. In G. M. Mras, P. Weingartner, & B. Ritter (Eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics : Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium (No. 27; Issue 27, pp. 169–182). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-011