Publication: On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types
On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types
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Kushnir, A. (2013). On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types (No. 129; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates at least the same social surplus. In addition, if there is a social alternative that is inferior to the other alternatives for all agents the dominant strategy ince
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Kushnir, A. (2013). On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of correlated types (No. 129; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
