Publication: Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype
Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype
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Blind, G. D., & Lottanti von Mandach, S. (2021). Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 16(2), 381–410. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-020-00307-0
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Stereotypes matter for economic interaction if counterparty utility is informed by factors other than price. Stereotyped agents may engage in efforts to counter stereotype by adapting to in-group standards. We present a model informing the optimal extent of these efforts depending on an agent’s (a) share of total transactions between out- and in-group agents; and (b) share of repeated transaction pairings with in-group counterparties. Low values of (a) suppress the effect of adaptation efforts on the stereotype itself (persistence). I
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Blind, G. D., & Lottanti von Mandach, S. (2021). Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 16(2), 381–410. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-020-00307-0