Publication: Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
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Alós-Ferrer, C., & Buckenmaier, J. (2017). Trader matching and the selection of market institutions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 69, 118–127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001
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We analyze a stochastic dynamic learning model with boundedly rational traders who can choose among trading institutions with different matching characteristics. The framework allows for institutions featuring multiple prices (per good), thus violating the “law of one price.” We find that centralized institutions are stochastically stable for a broad class of dynamics and behavioral rules, independently of which other institutions are available. However, some decentralized institutions featuring multiple prices can also survive in the
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Alós-Ferrer, C., & Buckenmaier, J. (2017). Trader matching and the selection of market institutions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 69, 118–127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001