Publication: Belief updating and the demand for information
Belief updating and the demand for information
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Ambühl, S., & Li, S. (2018). Belief updating and the demand for information. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.009
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How do individuals value noisy information that guides economic decisions? In our laboratory experiment, we find that individuals underreact to increasing the informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty. Both biases are entirely due to non-standard belief updating, rather than due to non-standard risk preferences. We find that individuals differ consistently in their responsiveness to information - the extent that their beliefs move
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- Li, Shengwu
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Citations
Ambühl, S., & Li, S. (2018). Belief updating and the demand for information. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.009
