Publication: Best-reply matching in games
Best-reply matching in games
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Droste, E., Kosfeld, M., & Voorneveld, M. (2003). Best-reply matching in games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 46(3), 291–309. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9
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We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply ma
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- Droste, E
- Kosfeld, M
- Voorneveld, M
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Droste, E., Kosfeld, M., & Voorneveld, M. (2003). Best-reply matching in games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 46(3), 291–309. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00065-9
