Publication: The role of procedural rationality in debiasing acquisition decisions of overconfident CEOs
The role of procedural rationality in debiasing acquisition decisions of overconfident CEOs
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Pavićević, S., & Keil, T. (2021). The role of procedural rationality in debiasing acquisition decisions of overconfident CEOs. Strategic Management Journal, 42, 1696–1715. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3319
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In corporate acquisitions, overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) often make biased decisions, subsequently paying unjustifiably high acquisition premiums. We investigate the predeal process in which the acquisition premium is decided upon and, drawing from procedural rationality theory, argue that the pursuit of greater procedural rationality through slow-paced predeal processes reduces the tendency of overconfident CEOs to inflate acquisition premiums. The empirical results based on a sample of acquisitions
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- Pavićević, Stevo
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Pavićević, S., & Keil, T. (2021). The role of procedural rationality in debiasing acquisition decisions of overconfident CEOs. Strategic Management Journal, 42, 1696–1715. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3319
