Publication: Balancing International Commitments and Democratic Accountability: Exit Clauses in Investment Agreements
Balancing International Commitments and Democratic Accountability: Exit Clauses in Investment Agreements
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Huikuri, T.-A., & Shim, S. (2025). Balancing International Commitments and Democratic Accountability: Exit Clauses in Investment Agreements. International Studies Quarterly, 69, sqaf012. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf012
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Why do states sign international agreements with varying commitment lengths? Growing literature examines when states exit international institutions. However, international agreements differ in how long a state must commit before it is legally free after a withdrawal decision. Notably, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) exhibit significant variation in commitment periods even in the same issue area. We argue that exit clauses in BITs depend on both domestic uncertainty and international commitment issues. Capital-exporting countries
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Huikuri, T.-A., & Shim, S. (2025). Balancing International Commitments and Democratic Accountability: Exit Clauses in Investment Agreements. International Studies Quarterly, 69, sqaf012. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf012