Publication: Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
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Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0434-0
Abstract
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This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical predictions, incurring substantial losses. There is high variance in individual bids and strong heterogeneity across individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and group bids are less heterogeneous than ind
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- Sheremeta, Roman M
- Zhang, Jingjing
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Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0434-0
