Publication: Agent-relative reasons as second-order value responses
Agent-relative reasons as second-order value responses
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Löschke, J. (2020). Agent-relative reasons as second-order value responses. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(4), 477–491. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.3
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Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent
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Löschke, J. (2020). Agent-relative reasons as second-order value responses. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(4), 477–491. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.3