Publication: Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments
Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments
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Berger, R., Rauhut, H., Prade, S., & Helbing, D. (2012). Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments. Social Science Research, 41(2), 372–379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.09.009
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While preference-based explanations play an increasing role in economics and sociology, the accurate measurement of social preferences deserves more attention. Most laboratory experiments measure social preferences by studying the division of ‘‘a cake that nobody had to bake’’ (Güth and Kliemt, 2003). This article reports results of the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter a
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- Berger, Roger
- Rauhut, Heiko
- Prade, Simone
- Helbing, Dirk
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Berger, R., Rauhut, H., Prade, S., & Helbing, D. (2012). Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments. Social Science Research, 41(2), 372–379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.09.009