Publication: Managerial Power and Compensation
Managerial Power and Compensation
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Frey, B. S., & Kucher, M. (1999). Managerial Power and Compensation (No. 28; Working Paper Series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics).
Abstract
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According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two elements. The two opposing propositions are tested using a large survey data set from Switzerland. The results suggest that power positions do not
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Frey, B. S., & Kucher, M. (1999). Managerial Power and Compensation (No. 28; Working Paper Series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics).
