Publication: Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
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Nax, H. H., & Pradelski, B. (2016). Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market. Games, 7(2), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020010
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We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individually or collectively as unions, adjusting wage demands upward/downward depending on whether they are currently employed/unemployed. We show that s
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Nax, H. H., & Pradelski, B. (2016). Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market. Games, 7(2), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020010
