Publication: The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite?
The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite?
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Backes-Gellner, U., Mohrenweiser, J., & Pull, K. (2015). The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite? Economic and Industrial Democracy, 36(2), 215–238. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X13501002
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The German Code termination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or more employees the right to have a works councillor who is fully exempted from his or her regular job duties while still paid his or her regular salary. We analyse theoretically and empirically how this de jure right to exemptions translates into de facto practice, and we explicitly take into account the nature of the employment relations participation regime. We find that the right of exemption has no effect in cooperative employment
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Backes-Gellner, U., Mohrenweiser, J., & Pull, K. (2015). The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite? Economic and Industrial Democracy, 36(2), 215–238. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X13501002