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Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players


Ewerhart, Christian (2017). Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players. Working paper series / Department of Economics 243, University of Zurich.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D72, J71
Uncontrolled Keywords:Tullock contest, Nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination, Lotterie, Bewertung, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Diskriminanzanalyse
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Date:March 2017
Deposited On:07 Mar 2017 12:36
Last Modified:14 Mar 2024 15:42
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:8
ISSN:1664-7041
OA Status:Green
Related URLs:https://www.zora.uzh.ch/137301/
https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:14656
  • Content: Published Version