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Ewerhart, Christian (2017). Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players. Working paper series / Department of Economics 243, University of Zurich.
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C72, D72, J71 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Tullock contest, Nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination, Lotterie, Bewertung, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Diskriminanzanalyse |
| Scope: | Discipline-based scholarship (basic research) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2017 |
| Deposited On: | 07 Mar 2017 12:36 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Mar 2024 15:42 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number of Pages: | 8 |
| ISSN: | 1664-7041 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Related URLs: | https://www.zora.uzh.ch/137301/ https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html |
| Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:14656 |
Ewerhart, Christian