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Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players


Ewerhart, Christian (2017). Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players. Economics Letters, 157:167-170.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image.

Abstract

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Tullock contest, nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Date:2017
Deposited On:23 May 2017 13:46
Last Modified:19 May 2024 03:36
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
OA Status:Hybrid
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012
Related URLs:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517301908
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/135994/
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:14844
  • Content: Accepted Version
  • Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)