The relationship between aid and voting in UN agencies has been well documented in the aid literature. We extend this analysis to the wider field of international negotiations, outside the sphere of formal voting, where decisions are mostly taken by consensus. Is aid used strategically to influence the negotiations in this context, too? Based on a novel dataset on negotiation behavior under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change we assess whether countries obtaining aid react by expressing increased support and/or reduced opposition towards the donor. Applying linear and instrumental variable regressions on a three-dimensional panel dataset with donor-recipient dyads for the period 2002-2013 enables us to distinguish between long-term partnerships and the strategic use of aid for the purpose of the negotiations. We find that aid can indeed buy support in the climate negotiations, but that this opportunity tends to be limited to mitigation and adaptation aid, rather than general aid. We argue that this is due to both greater demand for and greater supply of these specific types of aid, whose allocation is under the direct responsibility of the specialized delegates participating in the negotiations.