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A dilemma for epistemological disjunctivism


Schmidt, Eva (2018). A dilemma for epistemological disjunctivism. In: French, Robert; Smythies, John R. Direct versus indirect Realism - A neurophilosophical debate on consciousness. Cambridge: Elsevier, 141-162.

Abstract

I argue that epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by Pritchard (2012) or McDowell (1982/2009), faces a dilemma. To avoid collapsing into the “highest common factor view” (McDowell 1982/2009, 80), it has to combined with a metaphysical brand of disjunctivism. This is so because the epistemological disjunctivist’s contention, that veridical perception provides the perceiver with reflectively accessible epistemic reasons that are superior to those provided by hallucination, is tenable only if underwritten by the naïve realist claim that perception is partly constituted by the perceived fact. As I argue, this claim inexorably leads to metaphysical disjunctivism. So, epistemological disjunctivism cannot be advertised as a view that shares some of the advantages of metaphysical disjunctivism, but is less extreme and therefore more widely acceptable. In addition to presenting the dilemma, I discuss and reject one route of escape for the epistemological disjunctivist

Abstract

I argue that epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by Pritchard (2012) or McDowell (1982/2009), faces a dilemma. To avoid collapsing into the “highest common factor view” (McDowell 1982/2009, 80), it has to combined with a metaphysical brand of disjunctivism. This is so because the epistemological disjunctivist’s contention, that veridical perception provides the perceiver with reflectively accessible epistemic reasons that are superior to those provided by hallucination, is tenable only if underwritten by the naïve realist claim that perception is partly constituted by the perceived fact. As I argue, this claim inexorably leads to metaphysical disjunctivism. So, epistemological disjunctivism cannot be advertised as a view that shares some of the advantages of metaphysical disjunctivism, but is less extreme and therefore more widely acceptable. In addition to presenting the dilemma, I discuss and reject one route of escape for the epistemological disjunctivist

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Book Section, not_refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Health Sciences > General Medicine
Life Sciences > General Neuroscience
Language:English
Date:2018
Deposited On:07 Nov 2017 14:31
Last Modified:29 Jul 2020 06:38
Publisher:Elsevier
ISBN:9780128121412
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812141-2.00004-0
Related URLs:https://www.elsevier.com/books/direct-versus-indirect-realism/smythies/978-0-12-812141-2?author=&cat0=&categoryrestriction=&imprintname=&producttype=&publicationyear=2018&q=Smythies%2C%20John%20French%2C%20Robert&sort=relevance (Publisher)

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