While the current literature focuses on how social norms generate cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a new typology of normative conflict by combining Coleman’s (1990) distinction between conjoint and disjoint norms with our own classification of commitment-related and content-related normative conflicts (Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing 2012). We outline a theory of how the four resulting types of normative conflict can be ordered. We provide real-life examples and typical game-theoretical conceptualizations of the four cases and suggest how they can be sorted according to their conflict potential and the extent to which conflict can be restored by punishment. We then discuss a prototypical laboratory study for each of the types, and show how our theoretical arguments can be applied. We conclude with a discussion of how previously anomalous empirical results can be re-thought and understood in light of our theoretical reasoning. Finally, we give suggestions for prospective empirical micro-level corroborations and for mechanism design.