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Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization


Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen (2018). Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization. Working paper series / Department of Economics 286, University of Zurich.

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D72, D74
Uncontrolled Keywords:Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness
Language:English
Date:April 2018
Deposited On:27 Apr 2018 11:59
Last Modified:24 Sep 2019 23:28
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:10
ISSN:1664-7041
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp286.pdf
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php

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