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On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities


Kushnir, Alexey; Liu, Shuo (2018). On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities. Economic Theory:1-28.

Abstract

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent in Econometrica 78:1905–1938, 2010; Gershkov et al. in Econometrica 81: 197–220, 2013) to environments with nonlinear utilities satisfying a property of increasing differences over distributions and a convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.

Abstract

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent in Econometrica 78:1905–1938, 2010; Gershkov et al. in Econometrica 81: 197–220, 2013) to environments with nonlinear utilities satisfying a property of increasing differences over distributions and a convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design, nonlinear utilities, increasing differences over distributions
Language:English
Date:May 2018
Deposited On:14 May 2018 09:52
Last Modified:14 May 2018 09:53
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x
Official URL:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x

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