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Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization


Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen (2018). Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization. Economics Letters, 169:51-54.

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness
Language:English
Date:May 2018
Deposited On:15 May 2018 10:59
Last Modified:12 May 2020 00:00
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php?id=965

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