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Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen (2018). Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization. Economics Letters, 169:51-54.

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness
Scope:Discipline-based scholarship (basic research)
Language:English
Date:May 2018
Deposited On:15 May 2018 10:59
Last Modified:18 Jan 2025 02:40
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0165-1765
OA Status:Hybrid
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010
Related URLs:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php?id=965
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:16375
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