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Manipulability of stable mechanisms


Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2016). Manipulability of stable mechanisms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(2):202-214.

Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.

Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:May 2016
Deposited On:25 May 2018 09:14
Last Modified:30 Jun 2018 07:15
Publisher:American Economic Association
ISSN:1945-7669
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150035

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