Abstract
We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2016). Median stable matchings in two-sided markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 97:64-69.
Abstract
We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
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Additional indexing
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Finance
Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Median stable matchings, many-to-one matching with wages, many-to-many matching, matching with contracts, strong substitutability, the law of aggregate demand |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2016 |
| Deposited On: | 25 May 2018 10:52 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Sep 2023 11:43 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| OA Status: | Closed |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004 |
Chen, Peter