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Median stable matchings in two-sided markets


Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2016). Median stable matchings in two-sided markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 97:64-69.

Abstract

We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.

Abstract

We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Median stable matchings, many-to-one matching with wages, many-to-many matching, matching with contracts, strong substitutability, the law of aggregate demand
Language:English
Date:May 2016
Deposited On:25 May 2018 10:52
Last Modified:23 Dec 2019 08:05
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004

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