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Quantile stable mechanisms


Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M Bumin (2015). Quantile stable mechanisms. SSRN 2526505, University of Zurich.

Abstract

We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. This last result is of independent interest as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching when it exists.

Abstract

We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. This last result is of independent interest as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching when it exists.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C71, C78
Uncontrolled Keywords:Matching with contracts, quantile stable mechanisms, preference ranking
Language:English
Date:April 2015
Deposited On:05 Jul 2018 12:07
Last Modified:22 Sep 2023 03:29
Series Name:SSRN
Number of Pages:22
ISSN:1556-5068
OA Status:Green
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526505
Official URL:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526505
  • Content: Published Version