Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M Utku (2011). Trading cycles for school choice. SSRN 1899344, SSRN eLibrary.
In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.
In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C78, D78 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Mechanism design, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, matching, house allocation, house exchange, outside options |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2011 |
| Deposited On: | 05 Jul 2018 12:54 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Mar 2022 08:07 |
| Series Name: | SSRN |
| Number of Pages: | 13 |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899344 |
| Official URL: | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899344 |
Pycia, Marek