Abstract
Philosophical thinking about pleasure today, especially in the context of normative ethics, is deeply influenced by the concept’s function within Bentham’s and Mill’s Utilitarianism, according to which the moral quality of any action depends on its tendency to “maximize pleasure” and “minimize pain”. According to Mill’s own philosophy of science and language, the content and function of “pleasure” is determined by its role in scientific induction, specifically within the associationist psychological theory Mill shares with his father, James Mill. Pleasures, it turns out, are a quality of sensations with inductive links to other mental states, the power to explain actions, and the potential for being physiologically explained. The semantic content of “pleasure” as a general name, and thus the content of the moral precepts set up by Mill’s Principle of Utility, must be thought of as responsive to inductive progress in associationist psychology, ethology and the neurosciences.