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The reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility and the basing relation


Meylan, Anne (2019). The reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility and the basing relation. Erkenntnis, 84(4):877-893.

Abstract

In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility

Abstract

In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Physical Sciences > Logic
Language:English
Date:1 August 2019
Deposited On:11 Sep 2018 14:48
Last Modified:29 Jul 2020 07:40
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0165-0106
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9985-8

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