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An argument against the possibility of Gettiered beliefs


Gaultier, Benoît (2014). An argument against the possibility of Gettiered beliefs. Logos & Episteme, 5(3):265-274.

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier‘s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier‘s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Uncontrolled Keywords:belief, evidence, Gettier cases
Language:English
Date:1 January 2014
Deposited On:19 Oct 2018 09:05
Last Modified:31 Jul 2020 02:52
Publisher:Institutul European
ISSN:2069-0533
OA Status:Green
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2014532
Related URLs:https://www.pdcnet.org/logos-episteme/content/logos-episteme_2014_0005_0003_0265_0274 (Publisher)

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