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Gaultier, Benoît (2014). An argument against the possibility of Gettiered beliefs. Logos & Episteme, 5(3):265-274.
In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier‘s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 100 Philosophy |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | belief, evidence, Gettier cases |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 1 January 2014 |
| Deposited On: | 19 Oct 2018 09:05 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Jan 2022 18:32 |
| Publisher: | Institutul European |
| ISSN: | 2069-0533 |
| OA Status: | Gold |
| Free access at: | Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply. |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2014532 |
| Related URLs: | https://www.pdcnet.org/logos-episteme/content/logos-episteme_2014_0005_0003_0265_0274 (Publisher) |
Gaultier, Benoît