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Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Buckenmaier, Johannes (2018). Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences. Working paper series / Department of Economics 302, University of Zurich.

Abstract

Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on the extended preferences, voters will always have a strictly sincere best response (that is, a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given the ballots of other voters. The result holds for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness result for the case of dichotomous preferences on alternatives (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally assumed.

Abstract

Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on the extended preferences, voters will always have a strictly sincere best response (that is, a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given the ballots of other voters. The result holds for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness result for the case of dichotomous preferences on alternatives (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally assumed.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, D71, D72
Uncontrolled Keywords:Approval voting, manipulation, preferences among sets, strict sincerity
Language:English
Date:October 2018
Deposited On:12 Oct 2018 11:46
Last Modified:12 Oct 2018 11:57
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:21
ISSN:1664-7041
OA Status:Green
Official URL:http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php?id=981

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