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Friendship, value and interpretation


Löschke, Jörg (2017). Friendship, value and interpretation. Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 83(4):319-340.

Abstract

A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so‐called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one's friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted.

Abstract

A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so‐called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one's friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:01 Faculty of Theology > Center for Ethics
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Language:English
Date:1 December 2017
Deposited On:27 Mar 2019 10:20
Last Modified:25 Sep 2019 00:31
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:0040-5825
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12130
Project Information:
  • : FunderSNSF
  • : Grant ID100012_152918
  • : Project TitleDer normative Stellenwert akteur-relativer Gründe

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