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Voting with public information


Liu, Shuo (2019). Voting with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, 113:694-719.

Abstract

We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while the intuitive but inefficient follow-the-expert strategy profile almost always does. Although more information may be aggregated if agents are able to coordinate on more sophisticated equilibria, inefficiency can persist even in large elections if the provision of public information introduces general correlation between the signals observed by the agents. We propose simple voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes of the optimal ex post incentive compatible mechanisms with public information. Our voting procedures also have additional advantages when there is a concern for strategic disclosure of public information.

Abstract

We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while the intuitive but inefficient follow-the-expert strategy profile almost always does. Although more information may be aggregated if agents are able to coordinate on more sophisticated equilibria, inefficiency can persist even in large elections if the provision of public information introduces general correlation between the signals observed by the agents. We propose simple voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes of the optimal ex post incentive compatible mechanisms with public information. Our voting procedures also have additional advantages when there is a concern for strategic disclosure of public information.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Strategic voting, collective decision-making, public information, committee design, optimal voting rule, information disclosure, economics and econometrics, finance
Language:English
Date:1 January 2019
Deposited On:20 Mar 2019 12:31
Last Modified:20 Mar 2019 12:31
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.011
Official URL:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301866
Project Information:
  • : FunderSNSF
  • : Grant IDP1ZHP1_168260
  • : Project TitleIncentives and Institutions

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Embargo till: 2021-01-01