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Insider Trading, Disclosure, and Product Market Competition


Chen, Hui; Jorgensen, Bjorn N (2016). Insider Trading, Disclosure, and Product Market Competition. SSRN Electronic Journal 2358668, SSRN.

Abstract

Corporate insiders, particularly managers, not only have access to their firms' private information, but also control over their firms' operational decisions. In this paper, we consider a setting where managers manipulate the firms' real activities in anticipation of subsequent insider trading opportunities. We find these managers choose production quantities that are strictly higher than the quantities absent insider trading. The overproduction leads to lower firm profits but higher consumer surplus. When we allow the managers to trade both in their own firms' and their rival firms' stocks, we find that the competition among insiders in the financial market drives down the expected insider trading profits and their incentives to distort production decisions. We then discuss the scenario of "substitute trading" when the managers only trade in their rival firms' shares, and show that the managers can earn some insider benefits without sacrificing their firms' profitability. We also explore the possibility of endogenizing the managers' ownership through compensation contracts.

Abstract

Corporate insiders, particularly managers, not only have access to their firms' private information, but also control over their firms' operational decisions. In this paper, we consider a setting where managers manipulate the firms' real activities in anticipation of subsequent insider trading opportunities. We find these managers choose production quantities that are strictly higher than the quantities absent insider trading. The overproduction leads to lower firm profits but higher consumer surplus. When we allow the managers to trade both in their own firms' and their rival firms' stocks, we find that the competition among insiders in the financial market drives down the expected insider trading profits and their incentives to distort production decisions. We then discuss the scenario of "substitute trading" when the managers only trade in their rival firms' shares, and show that the managers can earn some insider benefits without sacrificing their firms' profitability. We also explore the possibility of endogenizing the managers' ownership through compensation contracts.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Business Administration
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:February 2016
Deposited On:23 Aug 2019 14:07
Last Modified:24 Mar 2020 08:22
Series Name:SSRN Electronic Journal
Number of Pages:56
ISSN:1556-5068
OA Status:Green
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2358668
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:18037

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