Kalhat, Javier (2008). Has the Later Wittgenstein Accounted for Necessity? Philosophical Investigations, 31(1):1-23.
In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.
In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 100 Philosophy |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | January 2008 |
| Deposited On: | 04 Mar 2009 11:04 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Feb 2018 11:10 |
| Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
| ISSN: | 0190-0536 |
| OA Status: | Closed |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.00331.x |
Full text not available from this repository.
View at publisher
Get full-text in a library
Kalhat, Javier