Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences


Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Buckenmaier, Johannes (2019). Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 117:388-401.

Abstract

Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on extended preferences, voters always have a strongly sincere best response (a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given other voters' ballots. An analogous result for sincere best responses obtains under weaker conditions. The results hold for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness result for dichotomous preferences (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally assumed.

Abstract

Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on extended preferences, voters always have a strongly sincere best response (a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly preferred to every disapproved one) given other voters' ballots. An analogous result for sincere best responses obtains under weaker conditions. The results hold for arbitrary preferences over candidates, allowing for indifferences but covering the extreme cases of dichotomous or strict preferences. As a corollary, we show that the classical strategy-proofness result for dichotomous preferences (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) holds for a larger class of preferences on sets than originally assumed.

Statistics

Citations

Altmetrics

Downloads

3 downloads since deposited on 18 Sep 2019
3 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Economics and econometrics, finance, approval voting, manipulation, preferences among sets, strong sincerity
Language:English
Date:September 2019
Deposited On:18 Sep 2019 14:28
Last Modified:30 Sep 2019 09:08
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.005

Download

Closed Access: Download allowed only for UZH members

Content: Accepted Version
Filetype: PDF - Registered users only until September 2022
Size: 232kB
View at publisher
Embargo till: 2022-09