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The theory of extensive form games


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus (2016). The theory of extensive form games. Berlin: Springer.

Abstract

This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the articles underlying it (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger2005a,b, Alós-Ferrer andRitzberger2008, Alós-Ferrer et al.2011, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger2013,2015,2016a,2016b,2016c). In compiling it, we have taken the chance to reorganizethe material and modify and slightly expand the articles to take advantage of thebook format. For example, a number of intuitive illustrations and a host of examplesdeveloped during the exploratory phase were not included in the articles due tospace constraints. Those have now been reinserted. Some side results that also didnot make it into the published articles have been added. A few examples from theprior literature which inspired our research are now reproduced in order to sparethe reader the need to consult other sources. Many figures which we used to gainintuition and showed in research seminars, but were not included in the papers (againdue to space constraints), have been inserted in the appropriate places.The mathematical prerequisites for the current book are within the commonbackground of advanced students and researchers in economic theory. Specifically,we assume that the reader is familiar with basic aspects of set theory and point-settopology. For those who have forgotten oneor the other definition, we offer a briefmathematical appendix that summarizes the most important concepts—without anyaspiration of complete coverage, of course. Other than that, the book is pretty muchself-contained in terms of the mathematics.What is assumed, however, is some basic familiarity with game theory and itsapplications. A host of examples are quoted throughout the book, largely fromeconomics and related fields, without going into detail on how these exampleswere derived. For instance, it is assumed that the reader has seen repeated games orstochastic games before and is familiar with the basic equilibrium concepts. Hence,the target audience is advanced students who have had at least a first course on gametheory, as well as researchers in the field of game theory.

Abstract

This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the articles underlying it (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger2005a,b, Alós-Ferrer andRitzberger2008, Alós-Ferrer et al.2011, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger2013,2015,2016a,2016b,2016c). In compiling it, we have taken the chance to reorganizethe material and modify and slightly expand the articles to take advantage of thebook format. For example, a number of intuitive illustrations and a host of examplesdeveloped during the exploratory phase were not included in the articles due tospace constraints. Those have now been reinserted. Some side results that also didnot make it into the published articles have been added. A few examples from theprior literature which inspired our research are now reproduced in order to sparethe reader the need to consult other sources. Many figures which we used to gainintuition and showed in research seminars, but were not included in the papers (againdue to space constraints), have been inserted in the appropriate places.The mathematical prerequisites for the current book are within the commonbackground of advanced students and researchers in economic theory. Specifically,we assume that the reader is familiar with basic aspects of set theory and point-settopology. For those who have forgotten oneor the other definition, we offer a briefmathematical appendix that summarizes the most important concepts—without anyaspiration of complete coverage, of course. Other than that, the book is pretty muchself-contained in terms of the mathematics.What is assumed, however, is some basic familiarity with game theory and itsapplications. A host of examples are quoted throughout the book, largely fromeconomics and related fields, without going into detail on how these exampleswere derived. For instance, it is assumed that the reader has seen repeated games orstochastic games before and is familiar with the basic equilibrium concepts. Hence,the target audience is advanced students who have had at least a first course on gametheory, as well as researchers in the field of game theory.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Monograph
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:2016
Deposited On:18 Sep 2019 14:53
Last Modified:25 Sep 2019 00:46
Publisher:Springer
Series Name:Springer Series in Game Theory
Number of Pages:239
ISSN:1868-5188
ISBN:978-3-662-49942-9
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3
Related URLs:https://www.recherche-portal.ch/primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid=ebi01_prod010688090&context=L&vid=ZAD&search_scope=default_scope&isFrbr=true&tab=default_tab&lang=de_DE (Library Catalogue)

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