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Who matters in coordination problems?


Sákovics, József; Steiner, Jakub (2012). Who matters in coordination problems? American Economic Review, 102(7):3439-3461.

Abstract

Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. Based on the analysis of the role of strategic uncertainty in coordination processes, we provide a methodology that can be used to find the optimal targets for a variety of interventions in a large class of coordination problems with heterogeneous agents.

Abstract

Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. Based on the analysis of the role of strategic uncertainty in coordination processes, we provide a methodology that can be used to find the optimal targets for a variety of interventions in a large class of coordination problems with heterogeneous agents.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Economics and Econometrics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Economics and econometrics, directed subsidies, heterogeneous agents, global games, strategic complementarity, strategic uncertainty
Language:English
Date:1 December 2012
Deposited On:24 Sep 2019 09:20
Last Modified:31 Jul 2020 03:40
Publisher:American Economic Association
ISSN:0002-8282
OA Status:Green
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3439

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