Steiner, Jakub (2007). A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms. Economics Bulletin, 8:online.
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Deposited On: | 24 Sep 2019 14:12 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2023 08:07 |
| Publisher: | Economics Bulletin |
| ISSN: | 1545-2921 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Free access at: | Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply. |
| Related URLs: | http://home.cerge-ei.cz/steiner/evolution4.pdf |
Steiner, Jakub