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A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms


Steiner, Jakub (2007). A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms. Economics Bulletin, 8:online.

Abstract

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

Abstract

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Language:English
Date:2007
Deposited On:24 Sep 2019 14:12
Last Modified:22 Apr 2020 21:11
Publisher:Economics Bulletin
ISSN:1545-2921
OA Status:Green
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Related URLs:http://home.cerge-ei.cz/steiner/evolution4.pdf

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