Navigation auf zora.uzh.ch

Search ZORA

ZORA (Zurich Open Repository and Archive)

Migration von ZORA auf die Software DSpace

ZORA will change to a new software on 8th September 2025. Please note: deadline for new submissions is 21th July 2025!

Information & dates for training courses can be found here: Information on Software Migration.

Additionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

Michaelowa, Axel; Hermwille, Lukas; Obergassel, Wolfgang; Butzengeiger, Sonja (2019). Additionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement. Climate Policy, 19(10):1211-1224.

Abstract

The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’ generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.

Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Political Science
Dewey Decimal Classification:320 Political science
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Global and Planetary Change
Physical Sciences > Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
Physical Sciences > Atmospheric Science
Physical Sciences > Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Uncontrolled Keywords:Atmospheric Science, General Environmental Science UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, market-based mechanisms, carbon markets, additionality, environmental integrity
Language:English
Date:26 November 2019
Deposited On:14 Oct 2019 15:01
Last Modified:20 Jun 2025 01:39
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:1469-3062
OA Status:Hybrid
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1628695
Download PDF  'Additionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement'.
Preview
  • Content: Published Version
  • Language: English
  • Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Metadata Export

Statistics

Citations

Dimensions.ai Metrics
62 citations in Web of Science®
64 citations in Scopus®
Google Scholar™

Altmetrics

Downloads

30 downloads since deposited on 14 Oct 2019
13 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Authors, Affiliations, Collaborations

Similar Publications