Do psychological defeaters undermine foundationalism in moral epistemology? : a critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against ethical intuitionism
Schwind, Philipp (2019). Do psychological defeaters undermine foundationalism in moral epistemology? : a critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against ethical intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22(4):941-952.
Additional indexing
| Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 01 Faculty of Theology and the Study of Religion > Center for Ethics
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 100 Philosophy |
| Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Social Sciences & Humanities > Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Philosophy, Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 14 August 2019 |
| Deposited On: | 25 Nov 2019 13:35 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Dec 2024 02:36 |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 1386-2820 |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10023-9 |
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10677-019-10023-9.pdf |
| Related URLs: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-019-10023-9 (Publisher) |
Permanent URL
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-176818
Download
Preview
Links
Statistics
Citations
Dimensions.ai Metrics
Schwind, Philipp