Schwind, Philipp (2019). Do psychological defeaters undermine foundationalism in moral epistemology? : a critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against ethical intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22(4):941-952.
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Item Type: | Journal Article, refereed, original work |
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Communities & Collections: | 01 Faculty of Theology > Center for Ethics
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 100 Philosophy |
Scopus Subject Areas: | Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Social Sciences & Humanities > Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Philosophy, Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
Language: | English |
Date: | 14 August 2019 |
Deposited On: | 25 Nov 2019 13:35 |
Last Modified: | 26 Jan 2022 23:05 |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 1386-2820 |
OA Status: | Green |
Publisher DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10023-9 |
Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10677-019-10023-9.pdf |
Related URLs: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-019-10023-9 (Publisher) |
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Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-176818
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University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Source of ORCID ID: Import from Crossref