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The Economics of Egg Trading: Mating Rate, Sperm Competition and Positive Frequency-Dependence


Henshaw, Jonathan M; Jennions, Michael D; Kokko, Hanna (2014). The Economics of Egg Trading: Mating Rate, Sperm Competition and Positive Frequency-Dependence. Dynamic Games and Applications, 4(4):379-390.

Abstract

Egg trading—the alternating exchange of egg parcels during mating by simultaneous hermaphrodites—is one of the best-documented examples of reciprocity between non-relatives. By offering eggs only to partners who reciprocate, traders increase their reproductive success in the male role, but at a potential cost of delaying or reducing fertilisation of their own eggs. Although several authors have considered the evolutionary stability of egg trading once it has evolved, little attention has been paid to how egg trading can invade a population in the first place. We begin to tackle this problem by formally showing that egg trading is under positive frequency-dependent selection: once the proportion of traders in a population exceeds a certain threshold, egg trading will go to fixation. We show that if mate encounters occur frequently, then the cost of withholding eggs from unreciprocating partners is reduced, making it easier for egg trading to evolve. In contrast, the presence of opportunistic ‘streaking’, where unpaired individuals join mating pairs but contribute only sperm, makes it more difficult for egg trading to invade. This is because streakers weaken the link between the number of eggs an individual can offer and its male-role reproductive success.

Abstract

Egg trading—the alternating exchange of egg parcels during mating by simultaneous hermaphrodites—is one of the best-documented examples of reciprocity between non-relatives. By offering eggs only to partners who reciprocate, traders increase their reproductive success in the male role, but at a potential cost of delaying or reducing fertilisation of their own eggs. Although several authors have considered the evolutionary stability of egg trading once it has evolved, little attention has been paid to how egg trading can invade a population in the first place. We begin to tackle this problem by formally showing that egg trading is under positive frequency-dependent selection: once the proportion of traders in a population exceeds a certain threshold, egg trading will go to fixation. We show that if mate encounters occur frequently, then the cost of withholding eggs from unreciprocating partners is reduced, making it easier for egg trading to evolve. In contrast, the presence of opportunistic ‘streaking’, where unpaired individuals join mating pairs but contribute only sperm, makes it more difficult for egg trading to invade. This is because streakers weaken the link between the number of eggs an individual can offer and its male-role reproductive success.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, not_refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:07 Faculty of Science > Institute of Evolutionary Biology and Environmental Studies
Dewey Decimal Classification:570 Life sciences; biology
590 Animals (Zoology)
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Physical Sciences > Computer Science Applications
Physical Sciences > Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
Physical Sciences > Computational Theory and Mathematics
Physical Sciences > Computational Mathematics
Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Statistics and Probability, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Applied Mathematics, Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design, Computational Mathematics, Computer Science Applications
Language:English
Date:1 December 2014
Deposited On:04 Dec 2019 16:03
Last Modified:31 Jul 2020 03:44
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:2153-0793
OA Status:Closed
Free access at:Publisher DOI. An embargo period may apply.
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0107-1

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