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Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems


Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora (2019). Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems. Journal of Economic Psychology, 71:37-58.

Abstract

We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts by (i) standardized computer reports or by (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers, representing a common form of consumer feedback. Compared to our baseline without reporting, computer reports reduce deception in all payoff scenarios while the effect of individually written reports is lower and in some scenarios only marginal. This comparably weaker impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially.

Abstract

We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts by (i) standardized computer reports or by (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers, representing a common form of consumer feedback. Compared to our baseline without reporting, computer reports reduce deception in all payoff scenarios while the effect of individually written reports is lower and in some scenarios only marginal. This comparably weaker impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Banking and Finance
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
Language:English
Date:1 March 2019
Deposited On:16 Jan 2020 08:23
Last Modified:16 Jan 2020 08:24
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0167-4870
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.10.001
Official URL:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167487017306207
Other Identification Number:merlin-id:16836

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