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Gründe für Vertrauen, Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Kompetenz


Budnik, Christian (2016). Gründe für Vertrauen, Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Kompetenz. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 64(1):103-118.

Abstract

One reason that trust is interesting for philosophers is that there are reasons for trust. We want to know when it is appropriate to trust other people, because trusting foolishly can be dangerous. The paper argues that there are two competing ways of understanding reasons of trust – a non-voluntarist and a voluntarist way. On the non-voluntarist picture, reasons for trust are associated with the trustworthiness of another person. On the voluntarist picture, you can appropriately trust another person without judging her to be trustworthy. In the paper a case is made against the voluntarist interpretation. At the same time it is argued that non-voluntarist theories of trust are faced with a particular problem. This problem has to do with the assumption that in order to appropriately trust another person you have to judge her competent in the relevant area of interaction. It is argued that this competence assumption should not be understood as a necessary condition for trustworthiness but rather as a necessary condition for mere reliability. Doing so helps to solve problems associated with trust in medicine ethics and political philosophy, and it opens up new perspectives for theories of trust.

Abstract

One reason that trust is interesting for philosophers is that there are reasons for trust. We want to know when it is appropriate to trust other people, because trusting foolishly can be dangerous. The paper argues that there are two competing ways of understanding reasons of trust – a non-voluntarist and a voluntarist way. On the non-voluntarist picture, reasons for trust are associated with the trustworthiness of another person. On the voluntarist picture, you can appropriately trust another person without judging her to be trustworthy. In the paper a case is made against the voluntarist interpretation. At the same time it is argued that non-voluntarist theories of trust are faced with a particular problem. This problem has to do with the assumption that in order to appropriately trust another person you have to judge her competent in the relevant area of interaction. It is argued that this competence assumption should not be understood as a necessary condition for trustworthiness but rather as a necessary condition for mere reliability. Doing so helps to solve problems associated with trust in medicine ethics and political philosophy, and it opens up new perspectives for theories of trust.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:01 Faculty of Theology > Center for Ethics
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Language:German
Date:1 January 2016
Deposited On:08 May 2020 12:15
Last Modified:31 Jul 2020 03:51
Publisher:De Gruyter
ISSN:0012-1045
OA Status:Green
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2016-0007
Official URL:https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/journals/dzph/64/1/article-p103.xml
Related URLs:https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/dzph (Publisher)
https://www.recherche-portal.ch/permalink/f/1h21i27/ebi01_prod001448021 (Library Catalogue)

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