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Ewerhart, Christian (2020). Finite blockchain games. Working paper series / Department of Economics 355, University of Zurich.
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Communities & Collections: | 03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C72, C73, D72, E42 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Blockchain, proof-of-work, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, selfish mining |
| Scope: | Discipline-based scholarship (basic research) |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2020 |
| Deposited On: | 20 Jul 2020 12:19 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Mar 2024 14:32 |
| Series Name: | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number of Pages: | 11 |
| ISSN: | 1664-705X |
| Additional Information: | Revised version |
| OA Status: | Green |
| Official URL: | https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html?paper-id=1037 |
| Other Identification Number: | merlin-id:19603 |
Ewerhart, Christian