Header

UZH-Logo

Maintenance Infos

Finite blockchain games


Ewerhart, Christian (2020). Finite blockchain games. Working paper series / Department of Economics 355, University of Zurich.

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.

Statistics

Downloads

29 downloads since deposited on 20 Jul 2020
29 downloads since 12 months
Detailed statistics

Additional indexing

Item Type:Working Paper
Communities & Collections:03 Faculty of Economics > Department of Economics
Working Paper Series > Department of Economics
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Economics
JEL Classification:C72, C73, D72, E42
Uncontrolled Keywords:Blockchain, proof-of-work, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, selfish mining
Language:English
Date:July 2020
Deposited On:20 Jul 2020 12:19
Last Modified:20 Jul 2020 12:19
Series Name:Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number of Pages:10
ISSN:1664-705X
OA Status:Green
Official URL:https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html?paper-id=1037

Download

Green Open Access

Download PDF  'Finite blockchain games'.
Preview
Content: Published Version
Language: English
Filetype: PDF
Size: 262kB