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Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation


Löschke, Jörg (2020). Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation. Philosophical Studies:Epub ahead of print.

Abstract

Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-leveltheory of moral explanationJo ̈rg Lo ̈schke1ÓSpringer Nature B.V. 2020AbstractDeontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in termsof reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussedhow to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly.Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms ofboth reasons and reasons to require: A is required touiff (1) A has most reason tou, and (2) there is most reason to require A tou. This promising proposal faces twoopen questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A touif A has most reason tou, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons playin generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue thatthe key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moralexplanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriateresponses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained interms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.

Abstract

Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-leveltheory of moral explanationJo ̈rg Lo ̈schke1ÓSpringer Nature B.V. 2020AbstractDeontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in termsof reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussedhow to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly.Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms ofboth reasons and reasons to require: A is required touiff (1) A has most reason tou, and (2) there is most reason to require A tou. This promising proposal faces twoopen questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A touif A has most reason tou, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons playin generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue thatthe key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moralexplanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriateresponses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained interms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:01 Faculty of Theology > Center for Ethics
06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Philosophy
Dewey Decimal Classification:100 Philosophy
Scopus Subject Areas:Social Sciences & Humanities > Philosophy
Uncontrolled Keywords:Philosophy
Language:English
Date:3 February 2020
Deposited On:29 Jul 2020 14:12
Last Modified:30 Jul 2020 20:00
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01426-x
Project Information:
  • : FunderSNSF
  • : Grant IDPP00P1_176703
  • : Project TitleValue-Based Non-Consequentialism

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