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Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas


Nax, Heinrich H; Rigos, Alexandros (2016). Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 395:194-203.

Abstract

Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.

Abstract

Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.

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Additional indexing

Item Type:Journal Article, refereed, original work
Communities & Collections:06 Faculty of Arts > Institute of Sociology
Dewey Decimal Classification:300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology
Scopus Subject Areas:Physical Sciences > Statistics and Probability
Physical Sciences > Modeling and Simulation
Life Sciences > General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
Life Sciences > General Immunology and Microbiology
Life Sciences > General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Physical Sciences > Applied Mathematics
Uncontrolled Keywords:Cooperation, (co-)evolution, Assortativity, Democratic consensus
Language:English
Date:21 April 2016
Deposited On:27 Nov 2020 12:19
Last Modified:28 Nov 2020 21:00
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-5193
OA Status:Closed
Publisher DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032
Project Information:
  • : FunderFP7
  • : Grant ID324247
  • : Project TitleMOMENTUM - Modeling the Emergence of Social Complexity and Order: How Individual and Societal Complexity Co-Evolve

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